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Note
Breaking Through the Silence:
Minnesota's Pregnancy Presumption and the
Right To Refuse Medical Treatment
Amy Lynn Jerdee*

Cases of pregnant women on life support, sadly, are no
longer unheard of. On April 24, 1999, Maria Lopez was declared brain-dead in a California hospital due to a rare condition called arteriovenous malformation. 1 Lopez was also pregnant with twins, leaving her family with the difficult decision of
whether to maintain her life support. Even though her family
was advised to withdraw life-support measures, they did not,
and subsequently the two children were successfully delivered
prematurely through cesarean section. 2 Maria Lopez, in fact,
has shown some improvement in her "brain-dead" status, and
is now able to communicate with gestures. 3 This scenario may
become more common as technological advances make possible
medical feats that previously would have been unthinkable.
However, such scenarios may also leave family members, pregnant women, and health care personnel caught in an ethical
dilemma. 4 The Minnesota advance directive5 law offers a
unique approach to end-of-life decision-making for pregnant
* J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S.N.
1995, Michigan State University; Registered Nurse, State of Minnesota. I
would like to thank Jeremy Jerdee for his continuous support and encouragement.
1. See Matthew Fordahl, Colton Woman out of Coma, Bears Twins,
PRESS-ENTERPRISE, July 8, 1999, at B3.
2. See id.
3. See id.

4. See ARTHUR CAPLAN, DUE CONSIDERATION: CONTROVERSY IN THE AGE
OF MEDICAL MIRACLES 21-22 (1998) (advocating court involvement in assisting decision-making by family members of a woman, vegetative for years, who
is now pregnant after having been raped in her hospital bed).
5. An advance directive is a legally binding document consisting of a
living will, a durable power of attorney or both. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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women and women of childbearing age. The pregnancy presumption, embodied in the state's advance directive statute,
has far-reaching implications for a woman and her fetus.
In 1998, the Minnesota Legislature fundamentally revised6
the then-existing Minnesota advance directive law7 by creating
one document that encompasses either a living will or durable
power of attorney, or both.8 Within the amended advance directive law is a pregnancy presumption provision containing
the requirements that must be satisfied in order to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment from a pregnant woman. 9
Some legal scholars contend that pregnancy provisions,
which mandate the continuation of life-sustaining treatment
during pregnancy, infringe on a person's right to refuse medical
treatment. 10 They assert that these provisions give more
weight to the state's interest in potential life than to the patient's right to refuse medical treatment. Their arguments,
however, raise many questions. For example, when a woman is
pregnant, is it constitutional to forbid withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment? Or, what if the woman has a living will
demanding withdrawal, even if pregnant, and the fetus is not
yet viable? State advance directive statutes rarely discuss the
viability of the fetus" and leave many issues unsettled about
how to properly resolve these situations.12
6. See generally Barbara J. Blumer, Minnesota's New Health Care Directive, 81 MINN. MED. 49, 49-52 (1998) (discussing the many changes to the

Minnesota advance directive law).
7.
8.

See MINN. STAT. § 145C (1998); see infra note 58.
See MINN. STAT. § 145C.01 subd. 5a (defining health care directive as

"a written instrument that complies with section 145C.03 [requirements] and
includes one or more health care instructions, a health care power of attorney,
or both; or a durable power of attorney for health care executed under this
chapter before August 1, 1998").
9. See Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, Presumptions, MINN.
STAT. § 145C.10(g).

10. See, e.g., Katherine A. Taylor, Compelling Pregnancy at Death's Door,
7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 85, 93 (concluding that pregnancy provisions should
not be constitutionally justified); Janice MacAvoy-Snitzer, Note, Pregnancy
Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1280, 1280 (1987) (arguing

that pregnancy provisions are unconstitutional when a woman has stated her
wishes in an advanced directive); Shannon K. Such, Note, Lifesaving Medical
Treatment for the Nonviable Fetus: Limitations on State Authority under Roe
v. Wade, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 965 (1986) (arguing that a person's privacy

interest should allow the refusal of lifesaving medical treatment before a fetus
is viable); see also infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the right to refuse medical
treatment and its limits).
11. Viable means that a fetus is "able to maintain an independent existence; able to live after birth." ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE,
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Minnesota made noteworthy strides in balancing the right
of women to refuse treatment with the state interest in the potential life of the child by amending its pregnancy provision,
which no longer makes the health care directive automatically
void with pregnancy.' 3 According to the statute, "the health
care provider shall presume that the patient would have
wanted such health care to be provided, even if the withholding
or withdrawal of such health care would be authorized were
she not pregnant." 14 The amended portion then allows the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if the wish is expressed, specific to pregnancy, within the living will or if there
is clear and convincing evidence that this is what the patient
would have wanted.' 5 This approach acknowledges the state
interest in potential fetal life while still preserving the pregnant patient's right to withdraw treatment. By amending the
advance directive statute, the Minnesota legislature hoped to
"encourage health professionals to discuss the issue with
16
women who are or could become pregnant."
This Note argues that the pregnancy presumption within
the revised Minnesota advance health care directive statute is
constitutional and should serve as a model for other states.
Part I provides an overview of the use of pregnancy provisions
and a discussion of the surrounding constitutional issues. Part
II discusses how the Minnesota statute should be applied and
how it succeeds in balancing the right to refuse medical treatment with the state interest in potential life. Part III suggests
how the statute could be improved, in addition to encouraging
other states to consider a similar approach. Suggestions for
improvement include promoting the further education of health
NURSING, AND ALLIED HEALTH 1199 (3d ed. 1983). "[Tlhe compelling point [of

the state's interest] is at viability.... [T]he fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 163 (1973); see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394 (1979) (holding that a viability determination requirement was impermissibly vague).
12.

See Timothy J. Burch, Incubator or Individual?: The Legal and Policy

Deficiencies of Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will and Advance Health Care Directive Statutes, 54 MD. L. REV. 528, 540-50 (1995) (discussing the applicabil-

ity of pregnancy clauses before and after fetal viability and determining that
the state interest in potential life will override the mother's interest in refusing medical treatment).
13. See MINN. STAT. § 145C.10(g).
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. Blumer, supra note 6, at 50 (discussing the more flexible advance directive law).
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care professionals and the public on the appropriate application
and lasting ramifications of the provision. The Note concludes
that the Minnesota advance directive pregnancy provision is
constitutional, but its language should be clarified to promote a
better understanding of its application.
I. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE PREGNANCY PROVISIONS AND
THEIR CONSTITUTIONALITY
A. ADVANCE HEALTH CARE DIRECTIVES
An advance directive statute allows individuals to make
decisions about the kind of care they want if they are unable to
make decisions on their own and to appoint someone to make
those decisions for them. 17 An advance directive is a legally
binding document that can consist of a living will, a durable
power of attorney, or both. 18 A living will is "[a] document
which governs the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment from an individual in the event of an incurable or irreversible condition that will cause death." 19 A durable power
of attorney allows a person appointed by another to make decisions as the agent of the other in the event that the person becomes disabled. 20 Currently, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have an advance directive statute of some kind, although they vary considerably among the states. 2 1 This varia17.

See ELSIE L. BANDMAN & BERTRAM BANDMAN, NURSING ETHICS:

THROUGH THE LIFE SPAN 284-85 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the assistance of
advance directives when health care professionals are faced with uncertainty
about the patient's wishes to maintain life-sustaining treatment).
18. See COMMITTEE ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LIFE 19899 (Marilyn J. Field & Christine K. Cassel eds., 1997) (discussing advance care
planning and the legally binding effect of written instruments in the planning).
19. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1102(6th ed. 1991).
20. See id. at 812.
21. The trend to enact advance directive legislation began in 1976 with
California's Natural Death Act. See CAL. ANN. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 2000); Christine K Cassel, Clinical Medicine and
Biomedical Ethics in the 1990s: A Physician Reflects, in A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLES?: FERMENT IN U.S. BIOETHICS 332-61 (Edwin R. DuBose et al.
eds., 1994) (explaining the history of enactment of advance directive statutes).
At the same time, there was also increasing public recognition of a right to refuse medical treatment. See COMMITTEE ON THE SOCIAL AND ETHICAL
IMPACTS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOMEDICINE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
SOCIETY'S CHOICES: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN BIOMEDICINE

38-39 (Ruth Ellen Bulger et al. eds., 1995) (discussing the new diagnostic and
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tion has resulted in some inconsistencies
and limitations in in22
terpreting the different statutes.
When people become seriously ill, health care professionals
and family members look to whether or not the patient has a
valid advance directive. 23 Based on research data, it is likely
that a person has not completed an advance directive, 24 and
25
even if they have, their wishes are often not clearly defined.
Additionally, health care professionals, families, and friends often hold divergent views concerning the patient's end-of-life
care management.2 6 In cases where a patient has completed an
advance directive, the health care provider is legally obligated
to abide by the patient's wishes to the extent that the wishes

therapeutic capabilities in medicine and the problems that this may bring);
MARGARET PABST BATriN, THE LEAST WORST DEATH 3-7 (1994) (recognizing
that "the new medical prospects ordinary individuals would face in dying"
blossomed following the Quinlan decision and has continued with medical
technological advancement).
22. See RAYMOND S. EDGE & JOHN RANDALL GROVES, ETHICS OF HEALTH
CARE 150-51 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing the limitations posed by living wills
compared with the use of durable powers of attorney).
23. The woman that completes an advance directive and is still of childbearing age must bring the directive to the attention of family members and
physicians. See ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT To DIE 400-01 (1989).
24. The SUPPORT study looked at the use of advance directives two years
before and two years after the enactment of the Patient Self-Determination
Act to find that "patients and their families did not know more about advance
directives or use them substantially more often" reporting use in "less than
one in four" cases as compared to one in five before the Act. Joan Teno et al.,
Advance Directives for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients:Effectiveness with
the Patient Self-DeterminationAct and the SUPPORTIntervention, 45 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC'Y 500, 505 (1997); see Laura C. Hanson & Eric Rodgman, The
Use of Living Wills at the End of Life, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1018,
1018 (1996) (finding that in a national study of 16,678 deaths, 9.8% of those
deceased had a living will).
25. See COMMITTEE ON THE SOCIAL AND ETHICAL IMPACTS OF
DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOMEDICINE, supra note 21, at 318 (stating that a concern
with living wills is that they lack specificity); Joanne Lynn & Joan Teno, A
Care Provider Perspective on Advance Directives and Surrogate DecisionMaking for Incompetent Adults in the United States, in ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
AND SURROGATE DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE 3, 16 (1998) (HansMartin Sass et al. eds., 1998) (arguing that advance directives are ineffective
because they lack clear instructions).
26. See BERNARD GERT ET AL., BIOETHICS: A RETURN TO FUNDAMENTALS
308-09 (1997) (asserting that it may be helpful to recognize the overwhelming
majority opinion to withdraw life-sustaining treatment in gravely ill patients
without an advance directive). See generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285 (1990) (establishing the right to refuse medical
treatment).
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stated in the advance directive can be understood. 27 Even if the
patient's wishes are not clearly defined, the document can be
utilized as a guideline in decision-making.
Advance directive statutes vary from state to state. Some
29
states have only a living will,28 or a durable power of attorney,
while other states have both a living will and durable power of
attorney in separate statutes. 30 Nevertheless, the majority of
27. See GERT ET AL., supra note 26, at 307 (discussing the policy implications of not following a patient's valid advance directive).
28. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to 2430 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10 (West 1992); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055 (West
1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to 206 (1999).
29. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, §§ 1-17 (West 1994); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.495 to .499 (West 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-3401
to 3432 (1995); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980-2994 (McKinney 1993).
30. For state living will statutes see: ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to .100
(Michie 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-18-101 to 113 (West 1999); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to 12 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to 27 (1993);
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1 to 35/10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-36-4-1 to 21 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 144A.1 to .12 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101 to
109 (1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.621 to .644 (Michie 1995 & Supp.
1999); MINN. STAT. §§ 145B-01 to 17 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.535

to 690 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to :16 (1996); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to 323 (1997 & Supp. 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-

06.4-01 to 14 (1991 & Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.01 to .15
(Anderson 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.11-1 to 14 (1996 & Supp. 1998); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-12D-1 to 22 (Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-

101 to 112 (Supp. 1999); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672.001 to .021
(West 1992 & Supp. 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to .920 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000); W. VA. CODE
§§ 16-30-1 to 13 (1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to .15 (West 1997 & Supp.
1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-22-101 to 109 (Michie 1999).
For states with durable power of attorney statutes see: ALASKA STAT.
§§ 13.26.332(l) to .335 (Michie 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-18.5-101 to
103 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 to 13 (1996 & Supp. 1999); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 551D (1993); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/4-1 to 12 (West 1993
& Supp. 1999); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 30-5-1-1 to 30-5-10-4 (Michie Supp. 1999);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144B.1 to .12 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 58-625 to 632 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629 (Michie 1995); MINN.
STAT. §§ 145C.01 to 16 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.800 to .860 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-J:1 to :16 (1996); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 32A-15 to 27 (1995 & Supp. 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.5-01 to 18
(1991 & Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11 to .17 (Anderson 1993
& Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-1 to 12 (1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 59-7-2.1 to 8 (Michie 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-201 to 216 (1996);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN §§ 135.001 to .018 (West 1997); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3451-3467 (1989 & Supp. 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 11.94.010 to .900 (West 1998); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30A-1 to 15 (1995); WiS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 155.01 to .80 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-201 to 213 (Michie 1999).
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states integrate a living will and a durable power of attorney
into one legal document. 3 1 This latter approach promotes clar32
ity while facilitating completion of both documents if desired.
1.

Pregnancy Provisions in the United States
While every state has enacted an advance directive statute,
only thirty-four states contemplate the validity of the advance
directive when a woman is pregnant. 33 Each of these pregnancy provisions has specific guidelines regarding the applica-

31. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to 13 (1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 363201 to 3262 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to 218
(Michie 1991 & Supp. 1999); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195
(West Supp. 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to 580d (West 1996 &
Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2518 (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 765.101 to .401 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to
09 (1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-801 to 817 (West 1998); MD.
CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GENERAL §§ 5-601 to 618 (1994 & Supp. 1998); MINN.

STAT. § 145C (1998); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to 121 (Supp. 1999); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-53 to 78 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-1 to 18

(Michie 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101.1 to .16 (West 1997 & Supp.
2000); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.005 to .660 (1990 & Supp. 1998); 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5401-5416 (West Supp. 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to

160 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to 1118 (1993 &
Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to 2993 (Michie Supp. 1999).
32. See, e.g., Linda Emmanuel, The Health CareDirective: Learning How
to Draft Advance Care Documents, 39 J. AM. GERIATRICS Socy 1221-28 (1991)
(discussing the preferred methods in drafting a model advance directive).
33. See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040(c) (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262(3) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§ 7189.5(c) (West Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104(2) (1999);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-574 (West 1996); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 2503(j) (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.113, 765.305 (West 1997); GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(a)(1) (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-6 (1993); IDAHO
CODE § 39-4504(4) (1998); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(c) (West 1992); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-8(d) (Michie 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103(a)(4)

(1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629(4) (Michie 1995); MINN. STAT.
145C.10(g) (1998); MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-9-202(3) (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3417(1)(b) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 449.624(4) (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:14 (1996);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-07(3) (Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2133.06(B) (Anderson 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 63, § 3101.4(B)(IV)(a)
(West 1997 & Supp. 1999); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5414(a) (West Supp.
1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.11-6(c) (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-70 (West
Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 59-7-2.8 (Michie 1993); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.019 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1109

(1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1)(d) (West Supp. 1999); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-102(b) (Michie
1999).
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bility of the advance directive during pregnancy.3 4 Requirements of the pregnancy provisions vary widely between states
but can be divided into two basic categories: the majority provision and all others. The majority provision automatically mandates the disregard of an advance directive throughout the entire pregnancy and has been adopted by seventeen states.3 5 For
example, Alabama's advance directive statute states that "[t]he
advance directive for health care of a declarant who is known to
be pregnant shall have no effect during the course of the declarant's pregnancy." 36 There are no qualifying statements
within these statutes that would permit enforcement of a valid
advance directive during pregnancy.
The remaining seventeen state statutes that do not follow
the majority provision employ varying requirements that will
prompt the application of the state's pregnancy provision. For
example, six states will not give effect to an advance directive if
it is probable that the fetus will develop to live birth,37 and four
states will not give effect if it is possible38 that the fetus will

34. For example, some states require a medical certainty that the fetus
will survive to the point of live birth before voiding the advance directive, see,
e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629 (Michie 1995), while other states require
only that the woman be pregnant before voiding the advance directive, see,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-574 (West 1996).
35.

See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (1997); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §

7189.5(c) (West Supp. 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-574 (West 1996);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-6 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504(4) (1998); IND. CODE

ANN. § 16-36-4-8(d) (Michie 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103(a)(4) (1992);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (West 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:14

(1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06(B) (Anderson 1998); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.4(B)(IV)(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. §
44-77-70 (West Supp. 1999); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.019
(West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1109 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.122.030(1)(d) (West Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West 1997);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-102(b) (Michie 1999). The Oregon statute is not included in this list of statutes, although § 127.540 lists abortion as a factor for
which the durable power of attorney "does not authorize the attorney-in-fact to
consent to... on behalf of the principal." OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.005 to .660
(1990 & Supp. 1998).
36. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (1997).
37. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040(c) (Michie 1998); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.
16, § 2503(j) (Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(3) (1999); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-3417(1)(b) (1995) (limiting the authority of the durable power of attorney "when the principal is known to be pregnant"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 449.624(4) (Michie 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.11-6(c) (1996).
38. "Possible" is defined as: "[clapable of existing, happening, being, becoming or coming to pass; feasible." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 808 (6th ed.
1991).
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develop to live birth.39 Kentucky and North Dakota require 4a0
medical certainty that the fetus will develop to live birth,
while Pennsylvania and South Dakota require both reasonable
medical certainty of live birth as well as assurance that physical harm or pain to the woman can be alleviated. 41 Florida
limits the ability of the proxy decision-maker to withdraw lifesustaining treatment throughout pregnancy. 42 Two other
states mention the viability of the fetus-Colorado requires fetal viability before voiding an advance care directive, 43 and
Georgia requires that the fetus not be viable to allow the discontinuation of treatment.44
Not only do the pregnancy provisions differ between states,
but also the language of the statutes is often ambiguous and
vague.45 For example, the Minnesota statute requires "a real
possibility that.., the fetus could survive to the point of live
birth," yet, the statute fails to define what is meant by the possibility of live birth.46 To date, few state courts have been required to interpret a pregnancy provision.47 In the rare in39. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262(3) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999)
("Notwithstanding my other directions, if I am known to be pregnant, I do not
want life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn if it is possible that the
embryo/fetus will develop to the point of live birth with the continued application of life-sustaining treatment."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (Michie
1991); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(c) (West 1992); MINN. STAT.
§ 145C.10(g). The Minnesota statute requires that there is "a real possibility ...the fetus could survive to the point of live birth." Id.
40. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629(4) (Michie 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-06.4-07(3) (Supp. 1999).
41. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5414(a) (West Supp. 1999); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-10 (Michie 1994).

42. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.113, 765.305 (West 1997).
43. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104(2) (1999) (requiring fetal viability and a medical certainty that the fetus will survive to live birth).
44. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(a)(1) (1996) (requiring fetal viability and
a statement within the living will to allow withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment).
45. See JAMES F. DRANE, CLINICAL BIOETHICS, THEORY AND PRACTICE IN
MEDIcAL-ETHICAL DECISIONMAKING 148 (1994) (stating that obtaining precise
details in an advance directive is not always helpful when the ideal goal is to
get "a reliable expression of patient preferences"); James Bopp, Jr. & Daniel
Avila, The Due Process "Rightto Life" in Cruzan and Its Impact on "Right-toDie" Law, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 193, 221 (1991) (discussing the lack of clarity in
state advance directive statutes).
46. MINN. STAT. § 145C.10(g) (1998).
47. See Gabrynowicz v. Heitkamp, 904 F. Supp. 1061, 1063-64 (D.N.D.
1995) (holding that a woman does not have standing to bring suit on the constitutionality of provisions regarding abortion and pregnancy under North
Dakota's Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act); DiNino v. State, 684 P.2d

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:971

stances where courts have been called upon to apply an advance directive pregnancy provision, the ambiguous language
has made the statute difficult to interpret and apply as the
legislature intended. 48 This has lead to inconsistent decision49
making.
Pregnancy provisions also create uncertainty for the medical practitioner. Because of continued advances in medical
treatment and technology, health care professionals are able to
maintain a person's life using extensive life support measures,
and therefore, are often forced to make urgent end-of-life decisions. These decisions create challenging moral and ethical dilemmas, especially when the patient is pregnant.5 0 For example, uncertainty about the patient's wishes for care at the end
of life5' may lead to the continuation of life-sustaining treatment in order to save the fetus. This situation may undermine
the traditional doctor-patient relationship because the physician may, in effect, feel obligated to withdraw her commitment
to the patient and become the fetus's practitioner.5 2 Thus,
pregnancy provisions may create a conflict of interest for physi-

1297, 1300 (Wash. 1984) (holding that a person could amend their living will
to delete a pregnancy provision); Molly C. Dyke, Note, A Matter of Life and
Death: PregnancyClauses in Living Will Statutes, 70 B.U. L. REV. 867, 870-72
(1990) (citing University Health Services v. Piazzi, No. CV86-RCCV-464 (Ga.
Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 1986) (unreported opinion) (holding that a brain-dead pregnant woman without a living will had no protectable privacy interest because
she was dead and that her wishes were irrelevant because her pregnancy
would have made a living will ineffective)).
48. A court may rely on established canons of statutory construction to
interpret ambiguous statutes. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S.
490, 507 (1979) (establishing the canon to avoid constitutional issues "in the
absence of a clear expression"); see also, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 485
U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (describing the "cardinal rule" against superfluous language in statutory interpretation).
49. See, e.g., DiNino, 684 P.2d at 1300 (failing to reach a decision on the
applicability of a pregnancy provision when the advance directive expressly
stated that pregnancy should not alter the force of the directive).
50. See generally BANDMAN & BANDMAN, supra note 17, at 273-305 (discussing the role of nurses in caring for the dying); COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MED. Assoc., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 45-61
(1998) (discussing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment).
51. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (discussing that
there was no clear indication by the mother of her wishes to undergo a cesarean section even though some thought that she had indicated that she did not
want the procedure done).
52.

See BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS, A GUIDE FOR

CLINICIANS 37 (1995) (discussing physicians' commitment to "do no harm" to
their patients).
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cians who must become advocates for the fetus, possibly at the
53
mother's expense.
2. The Minnesota Pregnancy Presumption
Prior to the 1998 amendment, Minnesota's pregnancy provision provided that "in the case of a living will of a patient that
the attending physician knows is pregnant, the living will must
not be given effect as long as it is possible that the fetus could
develop to the point of live birth with continued application of
life-sustaining treatment."54 To date, other states continue to
apply this standard and maintain the invalidity of an advance
directive once a person is found to be pregnant. 55 As amended,
the Minnesota pregnancy provision currently states:
[wihen a patient lacks decision-making capacity and is pregnant, and
in reasonable medical judgment there is a real possibility that if
health care to sustain her life and the life of the fetus is provided the
fetus could survive to the point of live birth, the health care provider
shall presume that the patient would have wanted such health care to
be provided, even if the withholding or withdrawal of such health care
would be authorized were she not pregnant. This presumption is negated by health care directive provisions [written within the directive] ...or, in the absence of such provisions, by clear and convincing

evidence
that the patient's wishes, while competent, were to the con56
trary.

Both the original57 and amended pregnancy provisions 58 create
a presumption, "an inference in favor of a particular fact,"59

53. See In re KI., 735 A.2d 448, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (concluding that
the best interest of a patient may be to forego painful resuscitative measures,
even if the patient's parents disagree with this course of action).
54. MINN. STAT. § 145B.13 subd. 3 (1998).
55. See supra note 39.
56.

MINN. STAT. § 145C.10(g).

57. See id. § 145B.13 subd. 3.
58. See id. § 145C.10(g). A valid Minnesota advance health care directive
executed prior to August 1, 1998, still remains in effect despite the 1998
amendment changing the statutory scheme to an integrated living will and
durable power of attorney because the current law did not repeal the previous
advance directive statute. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145C.03, Historical and
Statutory Notes (West 2000).
A document executed prior to August 1, 1998, that purports to be a
living will ...a durable power of attorney.., or a declaration regarding intrusive mental health treatment.., is valid if the document: (1) complied with the law in effect on the date executed; or (2)
complies with ...Minnesota Statutes, section 145C.03 [the 1998 requirements of a valid health care directive].
Id.
59. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1185 (6th ed. 1991).
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that a woman would want treatment continued in the case that
she was pregnant. However, the amended provision makes this
presumption rebuttable. It states that if a valid health directive document 6o or clear and convincing evidence indicate otherwise, treatment may be withheld or withdrawn. 61 Thus, the
amended Minnesota statute differs significantly from the majority of pregnancy provisions that do not recognize a right to
refuse medical treatment throughout pregnancy. 62
B. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

In determining the constitutionality of any pregnancy provision, it is important to understand that a pregnant woman
enjoys a constitutional privacy right to determine what will be
done to her body. 63 The privacy right includes a woman's right
to decide to terminate her pregnancy. 64 A woman also has a
liberty interest in refusing medical treatment. 65 However, once
a pregnant woman is no longer competent to make decisions,
should her right to refuse medical treatment be suspended because of her pregnancy? And what if there is no advance directive, when is it appropriate for the state's interest to override
the right to refuse medical treatment to protect the potential
life of the unborn?

60. See MINN. STAT. § 145C.05(2)(a)(10). This provision states "[a] health
care directive may include provisions consistent with this chapter, including,
but not limited to: ... health care instructions by a woman of child bearing age
regarding how she would like her pregnancy, if any, to affect health care decisions made on her behalf." Id.
61. The clear and convincing standard of proof is discussed in detail in
Cruzan, where the U.S. Supreme Court found that Nancy Cruzan's statement
to her housemate "that she would not want to live should she face life as a
'vegetable" was insufficient to meet the standard of proof necessary to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 285 (1990). In making its determination, the Supreme Court cited to
a New York case that required "proof sufficient to persuade the trier of fact
that the patient held a firm and settled commitment to the termination of life
supports under the circumstances like those presented.'" Id. at n.11 (quoting
In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531, 534 (1988)).
62. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (listing states that have
adopted the majority provision).
63. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269. ("Every human being.., has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body." (citation omitted)).
64. See infra Part I.B.2.
65. See infra Part I.B.1.

20001

PREGNANCY PROVISIONS

1. The Right To Refuse Medical Treatment
In the 1970s, advances in medical treatment and technology, along with the landmark In re Quinlan case, prompted a
66
movement to permit the refusal of life-sustaining treatment.
Quinlan was pivotal in defining the right of a parent to decide
to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment for his or her
child. 67 Karen Ann Quinlan, twenty-two years old, was declared to be in a "chronic and persistent 'vegetative' state,
68
having no awareness of anything or anyone around her."
Quinlan's father wanted to discontinue "all extraordinary
medical procedures" for his daughter. 69 The case raised the difficult issue of whether the interest in withdrawing life support
outweighed the competing state interest in the preservation of
life.70 The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the right
to privacy extends to allow a patient's surrogate the right to refuse medical treatment for the patient.7 1 The Quinlan decision
was based on the constitutional right to privacy recognized by
the federal courts.7 2 As a result, Karen Quinlan's father could
make a decision in the best interests of his daughter, and he
had the right to choose to withdraw her life-sustaining medical
73
treatment.
66. 355 A.2d 647, 647 (N.J. 1976); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the trend to enact advanced directives and the new technological capabilities).
67. See 355 A.2d at 652 (discussing the importance of the decision and the
profound impact it would have on society).
68. Id. at 655.
69. Id. at 651.
70. See id. at 663 (stating "[tihe claimed interests of the State in this case
are essentially the preservation and sanctity of human life").
71. See id. at 664. The court in Quinlan stated that "[wie think that the
State's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as
the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims." Id. The court
also discussed the penumbra of the right of privacy that allows the recognition
of this right as constitutionally protected. See id. at 663. Scholars argue that
the right to privacy approach was adopted from the right to abortion case law.
See, e.g., Alexander Morgan Capron, HistoricalOverview: Law and Public Perceptions, in BY NO EXTRAORDINARY MEANS 11, 12 (Joanne Lynn ed., 1986).
72. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663 (establishing the right of personal privacy under the federal Constitution).
73. See id. at 664 (concluding that the patient's right to privacy may be
asserted by her father under these circumstances to allow withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment); see also John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 338-40 (Minn.
1984) (discussing the ability to allow the removal of life-sustaining treatment
if it is found to be in the patient's best interest by a decision of the guardian or
conservator); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231-32 (N.J. 1985) (authorizing
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Fourteen years after the Quinlan case, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a patient's
right to die. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,74 the Supreme Court stated that "a competent person
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest [under the Due
Process Clause] in refusing unwanted medical treatment." 75
Cruzan involved a request by the parents of a patient in a permanent vegetative state76 to remove life-sustaining treatment.77 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, upheld the state's ability to require family members to prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" 78 that the incompetent person
would have wanted withdrawal of the life-sustaining treatment.79 Although the Court referred to a balancing of the state
interest in the preservation of life with the patient's liberty interest, 80 the test lacked the clarity necessary to give state
courts guidance in recognizing a liberty interest to refuse medical treatment. 81 Consequently, the Supreme Court decision althe withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in the furtherance of the patient's
best interests as established by the guardian).
74. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
75. Id. at 278.
76. Persistent vegetative state is defined as "generally, a condition in
which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant
cognitive function." Id. at 266; see also State v. Olson, 435 N.W.2d 530, 532
(Minn. 1989) (discussing the difference between a persistent vegetative state
and brain death).
77. Cruzan's parents requested that the hospital employees remove the
artificial nutrition and hydration that was keeping their daughter alive. See
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 267.
78. Id. at 282; see also Martin v. Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 409 (Mich.
1995) (discussing the requirements of the clear and convincing standard and
finding that a guardian's testimony and affidavit did not meet the standard to
allow withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment).
79. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281 ("We believe Missouri may legitimately
seek to safeguard the personal element of this choice through the imposition of
heightened evidentiary requirements."). See generally NORMAN L. CANTOR,
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE PURSUIT OF DEATH WITH DIGNITY 6 (1993)
(discussing the goal of the Supreme Court in Cruzan to safeguard a person's
right to self-determination through the clear and convincing evidence standard which actually ended up frustrating the probable choice of Nancy
Cruzan); LO, supra note 52, at 198 (concluding that "states may establish 'procedural safeguards' governing medical decisions for incompetent patients that
are more stringent than requirements for competent patients").
80. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (stating that once a liberty interest is
identified, a constitutional violation can be determined by balancing that interest with relevant state interests).
81. See id. ("[Flor purposes of this case, we assume that the United States
Constitution would grant a person a constitutionally protected right to refuse
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lowed the state to protect its interest in the preservation of life
and to not allow the withdrawal of treatment, unless there was
clear and convincing evidence that the person would want the
treatment withdrawn.
Under Cruzan, the right to refuse medical treatment was
attributed to the constitutional guarantee of a liberty interest
under the Due Process Clause, and not to a privacy right.82 Because the right to refuse medical treatment was not declared a
fundamental right,83 a compelling state interest could be strong
enough to override the patient's right to refuse medical treatment.8 4 For example, interests that could override the right to
refuse medical treatment include the preservation of life, 85 the
prevention of suicide, 86 the protection of third parties, 87 and the
88
maintenance of the ethical integrity of medical professionals.
lifesaving hydration and nutrition.").
82. See id. at 279 n.7 (discussing the constitutional basis for the right to
refuse medical treatment in the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest).
83.

See SUE WOODMAN, LAST RIGHTS, THE STRUGGLE OVER THE RIGHT TO

DIE 57-60 (1998) (discussing the Cruzan case and the fact that the Supreme
Court declined to decide that the right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
is a fundamental right); see also CANTOR, supra note 79, at 3-8 (discussing the
debate over whether Cruzan created a fundamental right through a liberty
interest).
84. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281 ("It cannot be disputed that the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing lifesustaining medical treatment.").
85. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (stating that "the
State does have an important and legitimate interest in... protecting the potentiality of human life"); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977) (stating that "[ilt is clear that the
most significant of the asserted State interests is that of the preservation of
human life").
86. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (1998) (stating that "[wihoever intentionally advises, encourages, or assists another in taking the other's own life
may be sentenced to imprisonment"); see also Foody v. Manchester Mem'l
Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 718 (Conn. 1984) (discussing the state interest in the
prevention of suicide); BATTIN, supra note 21, at 192-93 (discussing the public
policy issues associated with the prevention of suicide and the pressure exerted by right-to-die groups promoting the legalization of suicide in certain
situations).
87. See, e.g., In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984) (discussing
the state interest in the protection of third parties).
88. In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, the court
stated:
This survey of recent decisions involving the difficult question of
the right of an individual to refuse medical intervention or treatment
indicates.... [tihe State has a claimed interest in: (1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties;
(3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity
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Thus, the scope of the right to refuse medical treatment
has marked boundaries. The Supreme Court has determined
that terminally ill patients do not have the right to decide the
time and place of their death8 9 because "refusals of lifeprolonging therapy must be distinguished both from active
euthanasia and from assisted suicide."90 Accordingly, the judiciary's role is to balance the patient's right to refuse medical
treatment with countervailing state interests.9 1 The courts
have established that "countervailing state interests do not
preclude recognition of the individual right to have lifesustaining treatment discontinued." 92 Therefore, a competent
woman does have a constitutionally protected right to decide in
advance if she wants to continue her pregnancy in the case that
she must undergo life-sustaining treatment.9 3 However, the
state pregnancy provision would then dictate whether her
wishes are considered.
Notwithstanding the liberty interest, some courts have
limited a patient's right to refuse medical treatment once they
are declared brain-dead.9 4 For example, in University Health
of the medical profession.
370 N.E.2d at 425; see In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 339 (discussing the four
state rights that are balanced with an individual's right to refuse medical
treatment); John D. Hodson, JudicialPower to Order Discontinuance of LifeSustaining Treatment, 48 A.L.R. 67 § 7 (4th ed. 1986).
89. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808 (1997) (upholding a New York
law permitting the refusal of unwanted medical treatment as distinguished
from assisting suicide); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735-36 (1997)
(upholding a Washington law making it a crime to promote or assist a person
in suicide because a ban on assisted suicide is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest).
90. COMMITTEE ON THE SOCIAL AND ETHICAL IMPACTS OF DEVELOPMENTS
IN BIOMEDICINE, supra note 21, at 309; see also Vacco, 521 U.S. at 807-08 (explaining that the right to refuse medical treatment is rationally distinct from
assisting a suicide); In re Fiori, 652 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (discussing the state's interests in "the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of third parties and the integrity of the medical profession").
91. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231-32 (N.J. 1985) (discussing how
the state interest in preserving life is normally outweighed by the individual's
right to self-determination).
92. Hodson, supra note 88, § 2 (discussing the general power of the court
to allow the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment).
93. See Taylor, supra note 10, at 102-17 (discussing a woman's interest in
making decisions about her pregnancy before she undergoes life-sustaining
treatment or the withdrawal thereof).
94. See, e.g., Foody v. Manchester Mem'l Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 720 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that the discontinuation of a respirator would not
infringe on the state interest in preventing suicide); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d

20001

PREGNANCY PROVISIONS

Services v. Piazzi, the Georgia Superior Court held that a pregnant woman did not have a right to refuse medical treatment
because she no longer maintained the right once she was declared brain-dead.9 5 Although the woman did not actually have
a living will to trigger the pregnancy provision, the court still
considered the effect of the pregnancy provision and prohibited
from withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from the
her family
96
woman.
97 the District of Columbia Court of
In the case In re A. C.,
Appeals ordered that a mother, who was terminally ill with
cancer, undergo a cesarean delivery of her fetus. 98 Because the
court was unable to obtain an informed consent since she had
been declared incompetent, it made the decision to have the
procedure performed on the woman. 99 Two years later, the
D.C. Court of Appeals vacated that decision, 0 0 holding that a
pregnant patient near death, with a viable fetus, may decide
whether or not to have a cesarean delivery unless incompetent,
in which case the decision should be ascertained through substituted judgment. 01' The court stated that "[wle do not quite
foreclose the possibility that a conflicting state interest may be
115 (Mass. 1980) (holding that the protection of third parties or the state interest in the integrity of the medical profession did not preclude the termination of life support).
95. See Dyke, supra note 47, at 870-72 (citing University Health Services
v. Piazzi, No. CV86-RCCV-464 (Ga. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 1986) (unreported
opinion)).
96. See id.
97. 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated and remanded, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C.
1988), rehg granted, 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
98. See id. at 617.
99. See In re AC., 533 A.2d at 612-13 (describing the lack of clarity as to
whether the patient would have consented to a cesarean section).
100. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
101. See id. at 1237. Substituted judgment is when the court "as surrogate
for the incompetent, is to determine as best it can what choice that individual,
if competent, would make with respect to medical procedures." Id. at 1249
(quoting In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 750 (D.C. 1979)). Substituted judgment
may not always be an appropriate standard. For example, in a case where the
patient was mentally incompetent to make a decision throughout his entire
life, the court held that the patient should continue to get blood transfusions
when terminally ill, even if his guardian did not want him to receive them.
See In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981); see also Dawn Johnsen,
Shared Interests:PromotingHealthy Births Without Sacrificing Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 570-71 (1992) (discussing how courts have attempted to force pregnant women to act in the best interest of their fetuses
including eleven state court decisions forcing a woman to undergo a cesarean
section against her will).
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so compelling that the patient's wishes must yield, but we anticipate that such cases will be extremely rare and truly exceptional." 0 2 This decision was seen "as a giant step forward in
the fight to protect women's0 3rights... to refuse unwanted in1
vasive medical procedures."
Originally, state court consideration of the right to refuse
medical treatment included an analysis of statutory authority
and constitutional provisions authorizing the removal of lifesustaining treatment by a surrogate decision-maker. 1°4 Decisions were made in the best interests of the patient, l0 5 which
did not ordinarily extend the state interest in the preservation
of life to prohibit the individual's right to withdraw life06
sustaining treatment. 1
Specifically, in Minnesota the State Constitution provides
an independent privacy right, which also supports the right to
refuse medical treatment.10 7 This right "begins with protecting
the integrity of one's own body and includes the right not to
have it altered or invaded without consent." 0 8 The Minnesota
privacy right mirrors the federal privacy right as originally recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut.10 9 However, the state pro102. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1252.
103. Tracey E. Spruce, The Sound of Silence: Women's Voices in Medicine
and Law, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 239, 245; see also LO, supra note 52, at 92
(discussing recent court rulings forcing cesarean sections on women and the
trend away from this holding by the courts); LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN
ABORTION WAS A CRIME, WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES,

1867-1973, at 250-51 (1997) (discussing the ramifications of forced cesarean
sections).
104. See, e.g., In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 336-40 (Minn. 1984) (considering the decisions of other state courts to allow the removal of life-sustaining
treatment).
105. See, e.g., In re K.I., 735 A.2d 448, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that the
substituted judgment standard, which considers the totality of the circumstances, is used to "implement the wishes of the incompetent individual").
106. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (N.J. 1985) (discussing how the
right to self-determination outweighs the interest in the preservation of life).
107. See MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 2, 10. "Government is instituted for the
security, benefit and protection of the people, in whom all political power is
inherent, together with the right to alter, modify or reform government whenever required by the public good." MINN. CONST. art. I, § 1; see State v. Gray,
413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1987) (holding that the right to privacy is applicable only to the exercise of fundamental rights, that the state constitution can
provide more fundamental rights than the federal Constitution, and that fundamental rights are not limited to those expressly stated within the state constitution).
108. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148 (Minn. 1988).
109. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (discussing how "[viarious guarantees create
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vides greater protection of the right, as guaranteed by the Minnesota Bill of Rights. 110 Minnesota has also enacted statutes
that guarantee a competent patient the right to refuse medical
treatment' and prohibit a guardian from consenting to "any
medical care... which violates the known conscientious, religiolis, or moral belief of the ward or conservatee." 112 In the case
of In re Torres, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that
"the right ... to forego life-sustaining treatment [is] based upon
a constitutional right of privacy and/or the common law right to
be free from invasions of one's bodily integrity." 113 Although
the court upheld this right for a comatose patient, it did not
consider whether this right should be extended to allow the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a
pregnant woman.
Cruzan prompted state legislatures and Congress' 14 to address complex issues involving end-of-life care and to further
define the patient's rights."15 Accordingly, Congress passed the
Patient Self-Determination Act 1 6 to compel health care instituzones of privacy" in the penumbral emanations of the right to privacy within
the Constitution and striking down a law which prohibited the use of contraceptives by married persons).
110. See Gray, 413 N.W.2d at 111 (citations omitted).
111. See Patients Bill of Rights, MINN. STAT. § 144.651 subd. 12 (1998 &
Supp. 1999) (stating that competent patients and residents shall have the
right to refuse treatment; if the patient is incompetent or the legal circumstances require a limitation on the right to refuse treatment, the conditions
and circumstances of the limitation will be documented in the medical record).
112. Id. § 525.56 subd. 3(4)(a) (describing the guardian's or conservator's
power and duties).
113. 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984) (discussing the authority to remove
life-sustaining treatment and holding that a conservator can order the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment).
114. The legislature was called into action by other cases along with
Cruzan. See, e.g., id. at 341 (stating that "the legislative process would be a
superior method of insuring public input into such vital questions [as maintaining the heart and lung functions of a patient with brain damage]").
115. See id. at 339-40 (concluding that a combination of statutory and constitutional law allows courts to make decisions regarding the withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment); see also In re Drabick, 345 Cal. Rptr. 840, 855 (Ct.
App. 1988) (stating that the right to refuse treatment could be found in the
common law and the constitutional right to privacy); Dority v. Superior Court,
193 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291-92 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing a state statutory provision
defining the ability of the guardian to choose to withdraw life-sustaining support from a patient following a diagnosis of brain death); supra note 47 and
accompanying text (discussing cases of statutory interpretation by the courts
of pregnancy provisions).
116. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ 4751, 104 Stat. 1388-204 (1990). The Act provides that "the State, acting
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tions"1 7 to facilitate the completion of patients' advance directives.1 18 Cruzan also motivated right-to-die advocates to lobby
state and federal governments to further empower terminal patients with the right to make decisions about their care.1 19 The
right-to-die cause reached a turning point in 1997 with the
120
popular vote enactment of Oregon's Death With Dignity Act.
The Act allows physicians to prescribe deadly medications to
their patients. 121 However, the Act states that it is not to be
"construed to authorize a physician or any other person to end
a patient's life by lethal injection, mercy killing or active
euthanasia." 122 Overall, state legislatures have been cautious
through a State agency.., develop a written description of the law... concerning advance directives that would be distributed by providers or organizations." Id. § 4751(a)(1)(C). The Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) mandates that health care facilities give patients information, inquire if the person
has an advance directive, and provide education to the public about advance
directives. See id. § 4751(a)(2). "It must be remembered that the PSDA applies only to the competent, adult patient." Alexandra Gekas, The PSDA of
1991: What Does It Mean for Health-Care Organizations?, 2 J. CLINICAL
ETHICS 205 (1991); see Karen N. Swisher, Implementing the PSDA for Psychiatric Patients: A Common-Sense Approach, 2 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 199-205
(1991) (discussing the need to develop a standard to measure decision-making
capacity of patients in light of the PSDA's prompting of advance directive use).
117. The PSDA applies to hospitals, nursing facilities, home health care
providers, hospice programs, and health maintenance organizations. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, § 4751(a)(2)(A)-(E).
118. Senator Danforth of Missouri was prompted by the Cruzan case to initiate the PSDA of 1991. See WOODMAN, supra note 83, at 59-60 (discussing
the legislative response to the Cruzan decision); see also LO, supra note 52, at
199 (discussing the implications of the Cruzan case and the legislative response that the case prompted). Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Cruzan
may suggest the use of written advance directives, initiating the legislature's
enactment of the PSDA. See COMMITTEE ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, supra
note 18, at 202-03.
119. See BATTIN, supra note 21, at 192-94 (discussing public policy issues
and the right-to-die movements in the U.S.); Bopp & Avila, supra note 45, at
209-210 (discussing the substantive limitations on the right to die because
"that right is neither enumerated nor fundamental").
120. See JAMES F. BOHAN, THE HOUSE OF ATREUS, ABORTION AS A HUMAN
RIGHTS ISSUE 192 (1999) (discussing the use of the title "death with dignity,"
suggesting the euphemism that one would die without dignity by not choosing
assisted suicide); Rene Patel, Comment, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Is It
Time?, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 344-349 (1999) (discussing Oregon's "Death
With Dignity Act" and the safeguards within the statute to prevent unlawful
behavior).
121. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800 to .897 (1998); see also Renee Fox, The
Entry of U.S. Bioethics into the 1990s, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLES? 21, 30
(Edwin R. Dubose et al. eds., 1994) (discussing the attempts of California,
Oregon, and Washington to legalize physician-assisted dying).
122. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.880.
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in making decisions regarding assisted suicide, 123 and statutes
addressing care at the end of life are careful to assert that advance directives, including the Death with Dignity Act, are intended to allow a physician to end a person's life lawfully.' 24 As
physicians are given the legal means to end a person's life, the
profession faces its extreme discomfort with discussing end-oflife care. 12 5 This discomfort may be attributed to the physievery poscian's determination to maintain life and to exhaust
126
sible avenue before allowing death to prevail.
2. The Right To Terminate Pregnancy
One of the most widely known and debated cases of the
twentieth century held that a woman has a constitutional right
to choose whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.127 In Roe
v. Wade, the Supreme Court balanced a woman's right to
choose to have an abortion with the state interest in protecting
the potential human life as well as the health of the pregnant
woman. 128 The Court held that the constitutional right to pri123. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 788 (1997) (Souter,
J., concurring) (discussing the uncertainty of the legislatures and courts regarding the effects of legalizing assisted-suicide).
124. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.880 ("Nothing in... [the Death With Dignity
Act] ... shall be construed to authorize a physician or any other person to end
a patient's life by lethal injection, mercy killing or active euthanasia."); see
also MINN. STAT. § 145C.04 (1998) ("Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to authorize a directive or similar document to override the provisions ...

prohibiting assisted suicide.").

125. See, e.g., Brendan M. Reilly et. al., Can We Talk? Inpatient Discussions About Advance Directives in a Community Hospital, 154 ARCH. INT.
MED. 2299, 2306 (1994) (concluding that physicians failed to initiate advance
directive discussions with 42% of willing patients); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, The
Right to Refuse Medical Treatment: Where There Is a Right, There Ought to Be
a Remedy, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 649, 650-51 (1998) (discussing the difficulty physicians have in not prolonging the life of their patients).
126. The Hippocratic Oath supports this by stating a duty to "use treatment to help the sick.., but I will never use it to injure or wrong them."
NIGEL M. DE S. CAMERON, THE NEW MEDICINE: LIFE AND DEATH AFTER
HIPPOCRATES 25 (1992).

127. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that there is a constitutional right to abortion). The debate between pro-choice and pro-life advocates is fueled by the Roe Court's statement that the unborn are not recognized in law "as persons in the whole sense." Id. at 162. The pro-life
argument follows that even if the unborn are not deemed "persons" under Roe,
the fetus is still a "human being" and this gives them a right to life. See
BOHAN, supra note 120, at 10. In contrast, the pro-choice argument is that
"the fetus is not a person and thus abortion does not kill a person." EILEEN L.
MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK 5 (1996).

128. 410 U.S. at 162-63 (discussing that at certain points during a woman's
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vacy gave a woman the right to terminate a pregnancy during
"the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester."1 29 The Court also recognized that "some state regulation0
3
in areas protected by [the right of privacy] is appropriate"'
and that a state has a compelling interest in potential life once
the fetus is viable. 131 The trimester framework 132 defined speof life-sustaining
cific guidelines that would allow the removal
133
treatment before the fetus reached viability.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, however, altered the legal standard by which to evaluate
restrictions on abortion. 134 The Casey decision considered the
constitutionality of amendments to the Pennsylvania abortion
statute. 135 The Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, based
on stare decisis, 136 but overruled the use of the trimester
framework and fetal viability as a standard 137 by replacing it
with an "undue burden test."' 38 The undue burden test considpregnancy, each of the state's interests become compelling-the health of the
mother at the end of the first trimester and the fetus at the point of viability).
129. Id. at 164 (summarizing abortion rights through each trimester of
pregnancy).
130. Id. at 154. The Court discussed the requirement that state legislation
limiting the right to abortion be narrowly tailored to further a compelling
state interest. See id. at 155. See generally MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING
ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS

69 (1996) (discussing the impact of state laws on abortion).
131. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (stating that the state interest in fetal life
becomes compelling at viability because "the fetus then presumably has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb").
132. See id. at 163-65 (discussing the trimester framework that dictates
when a woman may obtain an abortion based on the compelling state interest
in potential fetal life after viability).
133. See Elizabeth Carlin Benton, Note, The Constitutionalityof Pregnancy
Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1821, 1825-26 (1990) (discussing the constitutional right to privacy under the Roe trimester framework).
134. 505 U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992) (plurality opinion).
135. See id. at 844.
136. See id. at 845-46.
137. See id. at 878-79; MacAvoy-Snitzer, supra note 10, at 1286 (stating
that the state cannot regulate the termination of life-sustaining treatment in a
pregnant woman before viability of the fetus); see also Benton, supra note 133,
at 1826 (arguing that a pregnant woman's living will should not be suspended
until the fetus is viable).
138. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (discussing the undue burden test as a guiding
principle in assessing the state statute); see also Elizabeth Reilly, The "Jurisprudence of Doubt: How the Premises of the Supreme Court'sAbortion Jurisprudence Undermine ProcreativeLiberty, 14 J.L. & POL. 757, 797 (1998) (describing a pregnant woman as invisible under the eyes of the law, thereby
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ers whether a law's purpose or effect is to place "a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." 139 The Court recognized a "profound" state interest
in potential fetal life140 and to some degree "demarcated the
limitations of state authority to regulate abortion."'14 Casey established a profound interest in potential life that was not
based on the trimester framework. 42
The abortion right is relevant to the right of a pregnant
woman to refuse medical treatment because the woman has a
right to terminate her pregnancy prior to the viability of the fetus. 43 Therefore, if the woman has an advance directive stating that she wants life-sustaining treatment withdrawn, it follows that she should be able to make the decision to withdraw
treatment, terminating her pregnancy with a fetus that is not
yet viable.' 44 Some legal commentators have argued that pregnancy provisions should not prohibit the termination of lifesustaining treatment for a pregnant woman 145 because it is unconstitutional to allow state regulation of a pregnant
woman's
46
termination of treatment before fetal viability. 1
creating a neglect of her rights that makes "virtually none" of the restrictions
on pregnant women an undue burden).
139. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
140. Id. at 878; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 494 (1989) ("There is also no reason why the State's compelling interest in
protecting potential human life should not extend throughout pregnancy.").
141. Clyde Wilcox, The Sources and Consequences of Public Attitudes Toward Abortion, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF ABORTION 82 (Ted G.
Jelen ed., 1995) (discussing possible scenarios in the future of abortion politics).
142. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-78 (discussing the "undue burden" test).
"[A] state's compelling interest in the life of a fetus does not vary according to
the gestational age." Patricia Fauser et al., Conclusion: Perspectives on the
Politics of Abortion, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF ABORTION, supra

note 141, at 193.
143. But see REAGAN, supra note 103, at 251-52 (discussing the limited access to abortion providers and financial restrictions that effectively abrogate a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy).
144. See James M. Jordan III, Note, Incubating for the State: The Precarious Autonomy of Persistently Vegetative and Brain-deadPregnant Women, 22
GA. L. REV. 1103, 1124-25 (1988) (stating that a pregnant woman, vegetative
or not, may choose to terminate her pregnancy under Roe).
145. See Benton, supra note 133, at 1826 (arguing that "under Roe, the
state may not prohibit abortion under the guise of a living will statute"); Dyke,
supra note 47, at 875-78 (describing the right to abortion as inapposite to the
living will pregnancy provision).
146. See, e.g., Benton, supra note 133, at 1826 (stating that statutes that
suspend a living will throughout pregnancy unconstitutionally infringe on a
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The privacy right supports the right to terminate pregnancy and is protected as a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 Abortion implicates the privacy right
because abortion rests on a woman's right to make choices
about her own body, not the body of another entity.148 The
right to privacy granted in the U.S. Constitution 149 is recognized by the Supreme Court to be within the "penumbra" of
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.' 50 Because "individual liberties under the state constitution may deserve greater protection
15 1
than those under the broadly worded federal Constitution,"
there is the capacity for states to further broaden the abortion
52
right. 1
State court decisions have generally held that the patient's
right to refuse medical treatment is not outweighed by the
state interest in preserving life.' 53 But when the withdrawal or
withholding of treatment leads to the termination of a patient's
pregnancy, the state's interest in potential life becomes
woman's "fundamental right to privacy and autonomy"). Limiting the right of
pregnant women to refuse medical treatment arguably "compel[s] women to be
involuntary incubators." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

964 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing the Roe v. Wade decision and the right to reproductive autonomy). See generally Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48-49 (1971) (arguing that requiring a woman to
continue her pregnancy is comparable to forcing a person to spend nine
months attached by tubes to a stranger).
147. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973).
148. See MCDONAGH, supra note 127, at 34-39 (viewing the fetus as a separate entity from the woman and arguing that a "balancing" of privacy rights is
altered by the pregnancy of the woman).
149. See supra note 63-64.
150. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (asserting that
the various explicit guarantees of the Bill of Rights implicitly create a protected zone of privacy).
151. State v. Herschberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1990).
152. See REAGAN, supra note 103, at 252 (discussing limitations that states
choose to impose on abortion).
153. See, e.g., McConnell v. Beverly Enters.-Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d 596, 605
(Conn. 1989) (holding that removal of a gastrostomy tube was authorized by
statute and no compelling state interest outweighed the patient's rights); In re
Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 416 (N.J. 1987) (holding that the right of a competent,
terminally ill patient to decline medical treatment outweighed the state interest in preserving life); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that
the state interest in the preservation of life does not outweigh the patient's interest in declining medical treatment). See generally CANTOR, supra note 79,
at 8-10 (discussing the balancing of the patient's interest in refusing lifesustaining treatment and the state interest in the preservation of life and preserving respect for the sanctity of life).
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stronger because another potential life is dependent on maintaining the life of the mother. 154 Commentators argue that
"[ulnder certain circumstances [the courts] may be the last resort for protecting the lives of those who cannot make their own
decisions," including both the patient and the fetus. 155 Thus, it
is difficult to balance the state interest in potential life with the
woman's interest in deciding what should be done to her
body. 156 Furthermore, Roe v. Wade's holding that a pregnancy
with a viable fetus can only be terminated when necessary to
preserve the life or health of a mother, 157 has not been overruled.
II. MINNESOTA'S PREGNANCY PRESUMPTION
A. ANALYZING THE MINNESOTA PREGNANCY PRESUMPTION
The Minnesota pregnancy presumption is different than all
other pregnancy provisions for several reasons. 158 Foremost,
the provision states that it will be presumed that the patient
would want life-sustaining treatment in the case that she is
found to be pregnant and there is a possibility that the fetus
will survive to live birth. 159 In addition, the statute allows the
withdrawal of treatment if indicated within her living will or
where there is clear and convincing evidence to show that this
154. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the standard of
proof that must be satisfied to allow withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
without pregnancy); see also Johnsen, supra note 101, at 570-71 (discussing
how courts have attempted to force pregnant women to act in the best interests of their fetuses, including eleven state court decisions forcing a woman to
undergo a cesarean section against her will).
155. EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S
GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE 170 (1988) (discussing the courts' role in decisions concerning incompetent patients); see also
Blair D. Condoll, Comment, Extending ConstitutionalProtection to the Viable
Fetus: A Woman's Right to Privacy, 22 S.U. L. REV. 149, 150 (1994) (stating
that abortion laws grant to viable fetuses rights "separate and apart from
those of pregnant women[,]" which infringe on a woman's privacy right).
156. See, e.g., Michael K. Steenson, Fundamental Rights in the "Gray"
Area: The Right of Privacy Under the Minnesota Constitution, WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 383, 399 (1994) (discussing the balance that is required between the
state's interest and the individual's right to choose what happens to their
body).
157. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
158. Some states, however, have some provisions similar to the Minnesota
statute. For example, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to 12 (1996) requires that the
patient must have specifically indicated her wish to withdraw treatment.
159. See MINN. STAT. § 145C.10(g) (1998).
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is what the woman would have wanted. 160 The Minnesota
statute goes beyond simply making the living will void with
pregnancy, it attempts to balance the woman's rights with
those of the fetus. This fundamental change makes Minnesota's statute preferable over other state statutes that do not
attempt to balance the mother's rights with the state interest
in potential life.
The majority of state pregnancy provisions adhere to the
presumption that the woman would want to continue lifesustaining treatment if she were pregnant and make all wishes
expressed in the advance directive automatically void with
pregnancy. 16 1 These state provisions, however, do not consider
that the fetus may not even survive until live birth, which
would eliminate the state interest altogether. Instead, the provisions simply eliminate the right of the patient to refuse
treatment without considering the strength or applicability of
the state interest in potential life. 162 Although there may be
less ambiguity in such provisions, the clarity is at the expense
of the mother's rights.
Apart from clear statements that an advance directive is
void with pregnancy, interpreting the ambiguous language of
the other states' pregnancy provisions is difficult. For example,
it is unclear what is actually required for it to be "possible" that
a fetus will develop to live birth 163 contrasted with the "probability" of live birth, 16 or a "medical certainty" that the fetus
will develop to live birth. 165 The statutes do not contain clear
definitions to guide courts with their interpretation. Additionally, courts cannot rely on fetal viability for direction because
such language is rarely written in the statutes. Only two
states address the viability of the fetus in their pregnancy provision. Colorado requires fetal viability and a medical certainty
that the fetus will survive to live birth to force continued
160. See id.
161. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing various state pregnancy provisions).
162. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (1997).
163. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (Michie 1991); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(c)
(West 1992).
164. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040 (Michie 1998); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 2503G) (1995 & Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(3) (West 1999);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3417(1)(b) (1996) (limiting the authority of the durable

power of attorney "when the principal is known to be pregnant"); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 449.624(4) (Michie 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.11-6(c) (1996).
165. See supra note 40
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treatment, 166 and Georgia requires that the fetus not be viable
and a statement within the living will to allow discontinuation
of life-sustaining treatment. 167 Both allow discontinuation of
treatment if the fetus is not viable but do not allow discontinuation or withdrawal of treatment with a viable fetus.
Other states probably have not addressed fetal viability because courts have recognized that there is a profound interest
in potential life before and after viability, 168 which would make
69
the use of the viability terminology superfluous.
Advance directives rarely include an option for women to
specifically express their wishes concerning pregnancy within
their advance directive. The Georgia statute highlights this
problem because it requires a woman's advance directive to
"specifically indicateE that the living will is to be carried out"
despite pregnancy. 170 Although the Minnesota's statute contains a similar provision, it does not require an express statement in the advance directive. 17 1 Thus, the Minnesota statute
favors the woman who may not have a completed health care
directive by allowing the family members to present clear and
convincing evidence of the woman's wishes. 7 2 This alleviates
the fear that a woman would completely lose her right to refuse
medical treatment with pregnancy in Minnesota.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MINNESOTA'S STATUTE
The Minnesota advance directive statute, as amended, balances the rights and interests of the patient against the state
interest within the constitutional boundaries established by the
Supreme Court. The statute skillfully integrates the state interest in potential life with a woman's right to refuse medical

166. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104(2) (1999).
167. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(a)(1) (1996) (requiring a statement
within the living will to allow withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment).
168. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (discussing the profound interest in potential fetal life).
169. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (describing the
"cardinal rule" against superfluous language in statutory interpretation).
170.

GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(a)(1).

171. See MINN. STAT. § 145C.10(g) (1998).
172. See id. (providing "or in the absence of such provisions, by clear and
convincing evidence that the patient's wishes, while competent, were to the
contrary"); see also Martin v. Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 409-13 (Mich. 1995)
(discussing the requirements of the clear and convincing standard and finding
that a guardian's testimony and affidavit did not meet the standard to allow
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment).
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treatment and to terminate her pregnancy. The Minnesota
statute offers needed flexibility when a pregnancy provision is
applied.
1. The Right To Refuse Medical Treatment
If a person has a valid advance directive in Minnesota, the
written documentation would allow the withdrawal or refusal
of life-sustaining treatment. Documentation that a woman
would still want treatment withdrawn if she were pregnant
supports the proposition that the woman considered the possibility of pregnancy and wanted her family members to know
her wishes. 173 If the woman does not have a living will, the patient's family would be able to present clear and convincing
evidence of the woman's wishes. The clear and convincing evidence standard is not easily met, as evidenced by the Cruzan
case. 174 The patient's family would have to show sufficient evidence specifying that the woman would want the treatment
withdrawn knowing of her pregnancy. 175 This would effectuate
the woman's option to refuse medical treatment, hence terminating the pregnancy but only before the fetus 76is viable without
further consideration of the specific situation.1
Cruzan established a liberty interest in refusing or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and upheld the use of the
clear and convincing evidence standard when balancing the patient's interests in refusing treatment and the state's interest
in potential life. 177 The right to refuse medical treatment is a
liberty interest and not a fundamental right. 178 Therefore, a
173. See MEISEL, supra note 23, at 400 (explaining the need for women of
childbearing age to address whether "they wish to include a provision stating
that the directive is to be operative or inoperative" within their advance directive).
174. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285 (1990)
(holding that the state's clear and convincing evidence standard is constitutional and that the showing by family members that Cruzan made statements
to a housemate that she would not want to live "as a 'vegetable'" were insufficient to meet that standard) (citing In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 72
N.Y.2d 517, 531 (1988) (requiring "proof sufficient to persuade the trier of fact
that the patient held a firm and settled commitment to the termination of life
supports under the circumstances like those presented"))).
175. See supranotes 78-79 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 101-02 and accompanying text (recognizing a patient's
right to decide whether or not to have a cesarean delivery of a viable fetus and
when this right may be overridden).
177. See supranotes 74-80 and accompanying text.
178. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278; supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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compelling state interest can potentially outweigh the right to
refuse medical treatment. 7 9 The right to refuse medical
treatment has been limited in some cases. However, In re A.C.
rejuvenated the recognized liberty interest by holding that the
substituted judgment of the incompetent pregnant woman
should be obtained before making the woman undergo a cesarean section to save the life of the fetus. 8 0 The decision did
leave open the possibility for compelling state interests that
might infringe on the right to refuse medical treatment, but acknowledged that this circumstance
would be "extremely rare
18
and truly exceptional." '
Minnesota's advance directive statute was amended to protect the patient's liberty interest while ensuring recognition of
the state interest in the preservation of life. Unlike the other
state statutes, the Minnesota pregnancy presumption does not
infringe on a person's right to refuse medical treatment. In
fact, the statute was enacted to allow women to effectuate their
wishes concerning end-of-life care. 8 2 The Minnesota statute
permits the court to examine the patient's wishes to make a
proper determination of whether her case falls within the exception that allows the refusal or withdrawal of medical treatment. 18 3 Such a system promotes judicial efficiency and the patient's liberty interests.
The Minnesota statute serves as a model for other states
because it effectively alleviates uncertainty by not automatically extending a woman's liberty interest to allow withdrawal
of treatment if she is pregnant. 8 4 Rather, the statute balances
the woman's rights with the state interest by requiring further
support of the woman's choice to withdraw treatment and terminate the pregnancy. 8 5 The statute presumes that the
woman wants health care provided to her, "even if the withholding or withdrawal ... would be authorized were she not
179. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (discussing interests
that could qualify as a compelling state interest that would override the right
to refuse medical treatment).
180. 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc); cf supra note 101.
181. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1252.
182. See supra text accompanying note 17.
183. See MINN. STAT. § 145C.10(g) (1998); supra text accompanying note

56.
184. See MINN. STAT. § 145C.10(g) (limiting the withdrawal of treatment in
a pregnant woman by requiring express indication within the living will or
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary).
185. See supra note 148 (discussing the "balancing" of privacy rights).
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pregnant." 86 This approach insures that a pregnancy will be
terminated only if the woman expresses her wishes within the
living will or there is clear and convincing evidence of her desire to withdraw treatment despite pregnancy. 187 This rebuttable presumption is in favor of protecting the life of a fetus because of the irreversibility of withholding or withdrawing lifesustaining treatment.
2. The Right To Terminate Pregnancy
The abortion right, as established in Roe v. Wade, 188 supports the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment resulting in
the termination of pregnancy if the patient so chooses and the
fetus is not viable. 189 Once the fetus reaches the point of viability, the courts would likely find that the state interest in
potential life outweighs the woman's right to refuse medical
treatment. 90 Because a woman can choose to have an abortion
before the fetus is viable, the statements in a living will that
call for the withdrawal of treatment should arguably not be infringed by a state statutory pregnancy provision. In fact, the
state regulation of abortion could be broadened depending on
the impact on individuals balanced against the magnitude of
the state interest. 191 However, once a woman is unable to decide on her own, her right to terminate pregnancy should not be
acted upon until it is determined that this is what she would
have wanted. This approach is precisely what the Minnesota
statute provides.
The constitutional right to privacy supports the right to
terminate pregnancy. 192 However, the Supreme Court has yet
to extend the privacy right to allow the withdrawal or refusal of
treatment when a woman is pregnant. Because the privacy
right in the abortion context permits the woman to make the
choice to abort a fetus before the fetus is viable, 193 under a Ca186. MINN. STAT. § 145C.10(g).
187.

See id.

188. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
189. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing how the abortion right, under Roe v. Wade, should not be infringed by a living will statute).
190. See Johnsen, supra note 101, at 570-71 (discussing the strength of the
government's interest in the life of the fetus).
191. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
192. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (establishing
the privacy rights within the penumbra of several constitutional guarantees).
193. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (extending the privacy
right to the abortion context).
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sey analysis, mandating the maintenance of a pregnant woman
on life-support before viability is arguably an "undue burden"
on the woman's right to refuse medical treatment.' 94 Furthermore, Casey reaffirmed that a state may not prohibit a woman
from deciding to 5terminate her pregnancy before the fetus
reaches viability.19
Under Casey's test, the Minnesota advance directive statute would not impose an undue burden on the woman simply
because it favors putting a woman's body through pregnancy
while she is in a vegetative state. But, is it an undue burden to
apply the Minnesota pregnancy provision to all pregnant
women when the state has only touched upon educating the
public on advance directives? Is there an actual program instituted to inform pregnant women specifically about their choices
regarding their pregnancy in the case that they become incompetent? Regardless of the responses to these questions, the
Minnesota statute offers a safeguard to the sweeping determination that all women are presumed to want treatment maintained. Although the clear and convincing standard is difficult
to satisfy, it is still a valid opportunity to effectuate the desired
treatment of a woman that has expressed her wishes. 196 The
97
woman maintains her privacy right to terminate pregnancy
98
or by clear
through an express statement in her living will
199
and convincing evidence.
The vast majority of state legislatures have not drafted
pregnancy provisions based on the viability of the fetus 20 0 because "the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting... the life of the fetus that may become a child."20 1 Furthermore, state abortion statutes address
194. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (applying the "undue burden" standard for state regulation of abortion); supra note 138 and accompanying text.
195. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
196. See supra notes 78-79 (discussing the clear and convincing standard
and recognizing that states may use such standard as a procedural safeguard).
197. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (discussing the trimester framework of the
abortion right).
198. See MINN. STAT. § 145C.05 subd. 2(a)(10) (1998).

199. See id. § 145C.10(g).
200.

Cf COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104(2) (West 1999) (requiring fetal

viability to allow the continuation of life-sustaining treatment along with a
medical certainty that the fetus will survive to live birth); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 31-32-8(a)(1) (1996) (requiring pre-viability to allow the discontinuation of
treatment and a statement within the living will).
201. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality
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the limitations on the right to terminate pregnancy at fetal viability. 20 2 Once the fetus is viable, the pregnancy can only be
terminated when "necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."2 3 Because the life or health of the mother is not at issue when the
mother is on life support, there is limited legal support allowing
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a woman
pregnant with a viable fetus.
The In re A.C. court held that a pregnant woman's terminal condition did not infringe on her decision to refuse a cesarean section because her right to bodily integrity was not lessened by her condition. 2°4 Consequently, the state could not
force the woman to have a cesarean section to save the life of
the viable fetus. 20 5 Likewise, the court suggested that the state
should not force a pregnant woman to maintain life-sustaining
medical treatment when her wishes are otherwise. 20 6 The In re
A.C. court analyzed the woman's right to refuse medical treat20 7
ment and limited the state's infringement on this right.
However, the court did not address the state's compelling interest in the potential life of the fetus. 20 8 Nonetheless, the court
considered a balancing of the state and the mother's interests
to supplement the substituted judgment of the patient. 209 This
balancing included consideration of "the mother's prognosis, the
viability of the fetus, the probable result of treatment or nontreatment for both mother and fetus, and the mother's likely
interest in avoiding impairment for her child together with her
own instincts for survival." 210 The Minnesota statute protects
the state interest in potential life while maintaining the

opinion) (discussing the legitimate state interest in potential life and its limitations).
202. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 145.412 subd. 3 (stating that it is unlawful to
terminate the pregnancy, with certain limited exceptions, when the fetus is
potentially viable).
203. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973).
204. 573 A.2d 1235, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("[Ilt matters not what
the quality of a patient's life may be; the right of bodily integrity is not extinguished simply because someone is ill, or even at death's door.").
205. See id. at 1246-48.
206. See id.
207.

See id.

208. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
209. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1251; see supra note 101.
210. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1251.
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woman's right to refuse treatment if this is the choice she
would have wanted given the circumstances.
III. SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS TO MINNESOTA'S
ADVANCE DIRECTIVE STATUTE
The Minnesota statute is constitutionally sound, but it
could be further improved. Minnesota's pregnancy provision
does not force a woman to do anything that she has stated,
written, or made known that she does not want to have done to
her body, as compared to other states that mandate the continuation of treatment during pregnancy. However, like its
counterparts in other states, the Minnesota statute does contain ambiguous language.
The current Minnesota pregnancy presumption states that
when:
a patient lacks decision-making capacity and is pregnant, and in reasonable medical judgment there is a real possibility that if health
care... is provided the fetus could survive to the point of live birth,
the health care provider21shall presume that the patient would have
wanted such health care. '

The Minnesota statute should define what is actually required
to reach the possibility of live birth beyond simply being pregnant. 212 As it stands, one could argue that the possibility that
the fetus will develop to the point of live birth would be at the
point of fetal viability.213 The language of the statute, however,
does not require fetal viability. 2 14 Therefore, the possibility of
development to the point of live birth arguably encompasses
the period before and after fetal viability.215 One can argue,
however, that there is always a possibility of live birth of a fetus when a woman is pregnant. It would seem that the possibility of live birth would only end upon termination of the
pregnancy. This ambiguity leaves physicians in a difficult position of deciding what the statute actually requires.

211. MINN. STAT. § 145C.10(g) (1998).
212. See supra note 38 (providing one definition of "possible").
213. See supra note 131 (declaring that the state interest in potential life
becomes compelling at fetal viability).
214. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text; cf. COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15-18-104(2) (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(a)(1) (1996) (requiring fetal viability and a statement -within the living will to allow withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment).
215. See supra notes 11, 38-39, 46 and accompanying text.
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The statute states that "in reasonable medical judg216
ment... the fetus could survive to the point of live birth."
This language does not create a standard beyond the chance,
even if it is a minute chance, of survival of the fetus. For example, this broad language could allow continued lifesustaining treatment for a fetus when it is known that it would
put the mother at risk for sustained pain.2 17 In balancing the
woman's interests with the state interest, could the right to refuse medical treatment outweigh the state interest in potential
life if the mother had to undergo extreme pain? The Minnesota
statute does not address these situations. The statute could be
amended to allow withdrawal of treatment without a living will
or clear and convincing evidence 218 if the fetus could possibly
survive, but where it is known that the mother would suffer severe pain. The Minnesota statute, as written, allows the patient's family to present clear and convincing evidence that
could weigh in favor of withdrawal of treatment if the situation
would create suffering for the mother.
Inserting a question into the model living will form that
inquires how the person wishes to be treated during pregnancy
would also improve the Minnesota statute. 2 19 This inquiry
would prompt health care personnel, lawyers, and the public to
offer the woman an opportunity to address her wishes for the
situation within the advance directive. Written information
within a living will is crucial to deciphering the wishes of the
patient if she becomes incompetent. Health care personnel and
the public may not have the requisite knowledge or understanding of advance directives to know that they must specifiimcally address the pregnancy provision and understand the 220
patient.
the
of
preferences
clear
the
determining
of
portance
216.
217.

MINN. STAT. § 145C.10(g).
Cf 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5414(a) (West Supp. 1999); S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS § 59-7-2.8 (Michie 1993).

[L]ife-sustaining treatment and artificial nutrition and hydration
shall be provided to a pregnant woman unless, to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty... such procedures will not maintain the
woman... to permit the... live birth of the unborn child or will be
physically harmful to the woman or prolong severe pain which cannot
be alleviated by medication.

Id.
218. See supra note 61 (discussing the clear and convincing standard).
219. See MINN. STAT. § 145C.16 (providing a living will form that does not
specifically mention pregnancy).
220. See supra notes 24-25 (noting that advance directives are underutilized and often lack specificity).
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It is important to recognize the significance of how informed health care personnel are when they care for patients at
the end of life.221 In many circumstances, physicians 222 and
nurses are responsible for assisting in the completion of the advance directive and discussing patient's rights directly with patients and their families. Are medical and nursing schools
dedicated to teaching students about advance directives and
pregnancy provisions? Are practicing professionals educating
new staff members about advance directives? Further education during school and in practice should be instituted by the
health care profession to keep health care professionals up to
date on changes in advance directive laws and the specific provisions of the state in which they are practicing. The state
should also play a role in educating attorneys and the public
about advance directives and their legal effect in a multitude of
circumstances, including pregnancy.
Finally, the fact that the Minnesota advance directive legislation has two separate statutory schemes (the pre- and post1998 amendment) 223 makes educating health care personnel
and the public even more imperative. Having two separate
statutory schemes in place allows one statute to govern advance directives completed before the amendment, and the
other revised statute to govern those completed after August 1,
1998.224 Health care professionals that are not adequately educated on the differences between directives executed prior to
August 1, 1998225 and the current version 226 could easily misinterpret the provision. In addition, the amended advance directive statute has other changes so any person with a completed
advance directive should be encouraged to update their directive to utilize the increased flexibility of the amendments. Updating is especially important for pregnant women or women of
child-bearing age, since an advance directive executed before
August 1, 1998 would mandate that she could not withdraw
221. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
health care professionals in creating advanced directives).
222. See supra note 125 (discussing the physician's role in carrying through
with advance directives).
223. See MINN. STAT. § 145B.011.
224. See id.; supra note 58 (describing the validity of an advance directive
written before the 1998 statutory amendment).
225. See MINN. STAT. § 145B.13(3) (providing the pre-1998 amendment
pregnancy provision, which is still in effect).
226. See id. § 145C.10(g) (providing the pregnancy provision for advance
directives created on or after August 1, 1998).
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life-sustaining treatment, making any wishes within her living
will void if she were pregnant.
CONCLUSION
The Minnesota advance directive pregnancy presumption
balances the woman's right to terminate a pregnancy and the
right to refuse medical treatment with the state interest in potential life. The woman has an opportunity to make her wishes
known in advance, as well as giving her the chance to discuss
the situation with her family or health care agent. These avenues recognize that pregnant women have rights in this situation that should not be ignored simply based on their pregnancy.
Nonetheless, the pregnancy provision creates a
rebuttable presumption that favors the state interest in potential life unless there is evidence that this is contrary to the
wishes of the patient. Even though Minnesota's statute could
be improved with further clarification and definitions, the intent of the statute is clear and the foundation constitutional.
Moreover, other states should amend their advance directive
statutes and follow the Minnesota statute by balancing the
woman's interests with those of the state. Like Minnesota's
statute, these statutes would offer a legitimate, peaceful, and
constitutional solution to a difficult situation.

